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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 08-1887 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES MONYA CARTER, 
                                               Appellant 
_____________ 
    
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of  Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-06-cr-00387-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 10, 2011 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  May 24, 2011) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 James Monya Carter pleaded guilty, consistent with the terms of a written 
plea agreement, to the first count of a three-count indictment, i.e., knowingly and 
intentionally distributing five grams or more of a substance containing a detectable 
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amount of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  The District Court determined that Carter’s offense level was 25 
and that his criminal history category was III, yielding a guidelines range of 70 to 
87 months.  The District Court sentenced Carter to, inter alia, 70 months 
imprisonment.  This timely appeal followed.
1
  
 Carter contends that the District Court committed procedural error because it 
incorrectly computed Carter’s criminal history category.  He also asserts that his 
sentence should be vacated and this matter remanded so that he may be 
resentenced  in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act of of 2010.  See Pub. L. 
No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).  The government asserts that Carter waived 
his right to challenge the District Court’s sentence.  It points out that Carter’s plea 
agreement contained a broad waiver of his rights to appeal and to seek collateral 
relief.   Because the two issues raised by Carter fall within the scope of the 
appellate waiver, we consider whether there is any basis for setting the waiver 
aside.   
 Carter submits that his appellate waiver should not be enforced because the 
District Court did not conduct an adequate colloquy under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N).  That Rule mandates that  
                                                 
1   The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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[b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty . . . the court must address 
the defendant personally in open court.  During this address, the court 
must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant 
understands . . . (N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision 
waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence. 
 
Carter is correct that the District Court failed to comply with this mandate.  The 
Court neither informed Carter of the appellate waiver nor ascertained whether he 
understood the terms of the waiver.  This was error.  United States v. Goodson, 544 
F.3d 529, 540 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Carter did not interpose a timely objection, however, to the deficiency in the 
Rule 11 colloquy.  For that reason, we review for plain error which requires that 
we decide “whether there was a violation of Rule 11(b)(1)(N), which warrants 
setting an appellate waiver aside.”  Id.  at 539 (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 
U.S. 55, 59 (2002)).  This requires consideration of the whole record to determine 
if the inadequate colloquy “precluded [Carter] from understanding that he had a 
right to appeal and that he had substantially agreed to give up that right.”  Id. at 
541.   
In this case, the appellate waiver was set forth in the plea agreement.  Carter 
signed the final page of the plea agreement in the presence of his counsel, 
acknowledging that he had read the plea agreement and had discussed it with his 
attorney.  During the plea colloquy, Carter affirmed that he had an eleventh grade 
education and was able to read the English language.  Although the District Court 
4 
 
did not discuss the appellate waiver during the change of plea colloquy, the 
prosecutor’s summary of the terms of the plea agreement indicated that it 
contained an appellate waiver.  The prosecutor accurately recited the terms of the 
waiver, including the three exceptions.  Carter agreed with the government’s 
summary of the terms of the plea agreement.  Furthermore, Carter had two prior 
convictions.  This criminal history suggests that, prior to this criminal proceeding, 
Carter was aware of a defendant’s right to appeal.  Given these circumstances, we 
conclude that the District Court’s error did not affect Carter’s substantial rights.2  
 Furthermore, we conclude that enforcement of Carter’s appellate waiver 
would not result in a miscarriage of justice.  See United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 
234, 244 (3d Cir. 2008).  His contention that the District Court incorrectly 
calculated his criminal history category lacks merit and this court has already 
determined that the Fair Sentencing Act is not retroactively applicable.  United 
States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
2   We recognize that Carter pleaded guilty before this Court issued United States v. 
Goodson and that the District Court did not have the benefit of our instruction regarding 
the important role that the district courts play “in assuring that the defendants fully 
understand the scope and terms of an appellate waiver.”  544 F.3d 529, 540 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Nonetheless, we reiterate that Rule 11(b) is mandatory, not hortatory.  
Accordingly, district judges must affirmatively endeavor to fulfill its dictates.  Id. 
 
